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Imagine an individual facing three identical investment decisions in a row. Each time she 
decides on how much to invest in a risky asset or save. Also, imagine the same individual deciding 
about three consecutive investments at once. Equal for rational investors, when suffering Myopic 
Loss Aversion, the latter scenario is perceived differently though: More is invested when payoffs 
are evaluated over a greater time horizon. Based on the theory of reference points I proposed a 
novel method – investment targets – to shift attention to longer-term goals. I find that exogenously 
proposed targets eliminate Myopic Loss Aversion in an experiment.           
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1. Introduction 
Following Mehra and Prescott (1985), the Equity Premium Puzzle describes historical higher 
real returns of stocks over governmental bonds in several developed countries. Though this is 
supposed to reflect the relative risk of stocks compared to “risk-free” government bonds, the rather 
sizeable premium still requires an unreasonably high level of risk aversion by investors. The most 
common explanation, termed Myopic Loss Aversion, was introduced by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
and is based on a combination of two other behavioral concepts Loss Aversion (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992) and Mental Accounting (Kahneman and Tversky 1984), discovered in studies 
following Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory. When influenced by Myopic Loss 
Aversion, investors are distinctly more sensitive to short-term losses than to short-term gains.  
After an initial experiment by Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy and Potters (1997) developed the 
probably most renown laboratory design that confirmed the existence of Myopic Loss Aversion in 
a repeated lottery setup which will be modified for the purpose of my thesis: Individuals have to 
make an investment decision over an endowment in a lottery with a slightly positive expected 
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return where some of them have to decide from lottery to lottery (and hence also evaluate in discrete 
steps) while others have to decide over three consecutive lotteries at once. The experimenters show 
in line with Myopic Loss Aversion a higher investment when individuals commit to three lotteries. 
Besides describing an economic phenomenon, it might also be of interest whether there exist 
mechanisms that help to overcome such biases, especially if agents profit from an increase in 
expected utility. Based on evidence from a field experiment conducted by Camerer et al. (1997) 
among cab drivers in New York, one intervention could be the introduction of a prospective 
reference point in form of an income target, as it might help individuals to contribute rationally to 
an investment schedule by maintaining self-control. Despite not being computationally easier than 
fixed savings, it allows a tracking of the invested amount and how much contribution is still needed. 
Following the experiment tradition on Myopic Loss Aversion initiated by Gneezy and Potters 
(1997), I conducted their initial laboratory design at Nova SBE in Portugal and extended it by 
introducing prospective reference points in form of exogenous and endogenous targets. I extended 
the existing standard theoretical model for the research purpose of this thesis and predict that an 
artificial prolonging of the evaluation period helps to surpass Myopic Loss Aversion. When 
proposing an exogenous target, I find evidence that the impact of myopic behavior is eliminated. 
Letting individuals only select an endogenous target is not enough though to overcome Myopic 
Loss Aversion if they were not provided with an exogenous target previously. Those who had such 
information before are aiming higher and are more likely to reach their endogenous target. 
Additionally, women overcome an otherwise persistent loss aversion when committing to the latter. 
In the following, section two recalls the experimental literature on reference points and Myopic 
Loss Aversion. Section three describes the proposed experiment and predicted behavior. Section 
four presents the experiment results. Section five concludes and discusses policy implications.   
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2. Literature review 
Despite the fact that the theory of Myopic Loss Aversion relies on reference points – losses or 
gains are always based on benchmarks – the literature on reference points has largely been separate 
from Myopic Loss Aversion. The following review presents the most relevant contributions of both. 
Stemming from the Equity Premium Puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985) and motivated by the 
discovery of Myopic Loss Aversion (Benartzi and Thaler 1995), a series of laboratory experiments 
has dealt with the phenomenon in a repeated investment framework. In Gneezy and Potters' (1997) 
initial design, individuals invested a self-selected part of an endowment in a series of twelve 
sequential lotteries, aware of the underlying winning probabilities. Participants were split into two 
different information feedback groups, where those treated with high-frequency feedback invested 
in every lottery separately while those under low-frequency invested ahead into a bundle of three 
lotteries. Myopic Loss Aversion was assumed to be present as those treated by the latter invested 
on average more per lottery, making a risky option under a longer evaluation period more attractive.  
Modifications of the experiment performed in recent years can be summarized in three main 
findings: Firstly, disentangling the effect of information feedback from the effect of decision 
flexibility leads to ambiguous results with Bellemare et al. (2005) arguing oppositely to Langer 
and Weber (2008) that Myopic Loss Aversion is driven by the former rather than the latter. Fellner 
and Sutter (2009) claim an equal effect of both with individual preferences for frequent feedback. 
Secondly, when analyzing retrospective reference points, Hopfensitz and Wranik (2008) added 
reflections on emotions and expectations and find a stronger Myopic Loss Aversion for individuals 
with low self-confidence or previously suffered losses. Hopfensitz (2009) confirms an impact of 
previous earnings on Myopic Loss Aversion and the underlying of a hot hand fallacy. Van der 
Heijden et al. (2012) find that impatient individuals suffer more from Myopic Loss Aversion. 
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Thirdly, when changing the scope of decision making Haigh and List (2005) and Eriksen and 
Kvaløy (2010a) show that financial professionals are more myopic loss averse than students. Using 
real financial assets, Gneezy et al. (2003) confirm their previous results (1997) while Beshears et 
al. (2017) cannot find evidence for myopic loss averse in this context. With changed decision rights, 
Sutter (2007) argues that investing in teams reduces Myopic Loss Aversion while Eriksen and 
Kvaløy (2010b) confirm Myopic Loss Aversion when deciding over other agents’ endowment. 
As mentioned above, Loss Aversion always has to be related to a reference point (Köszegi and 
Rabin, 2006), usually in form of possessed endowment, as a retrospective measure, but also in form 
of future endowment, as a prospective measure or target. For a long time, individual targeting has 
concerned economists not from an investment but rather a work income perspective when decisions 
about labor supply are made under certainty. Camerer et al. (1997), Köszegi and Rabin (2006), 
Farber (2005; 2008), Crawford and Meng (2011) and Doran (2014) study the behavior of New 
York cab drivers and show that younger drivers are loss averse around their daily income target 
and that a wage raise leads to a reduction in labor supply. Fehr and Goette (2007) argue that Swiss 
bike couriers reduce their work hours per shift in order to work more shifts and receive a higher 
salary. Pope and Schweitzer (2011) observe that golf professionals adjust their tournament strokes 
to payment targets. Abeler et al. (2011) show in a laboratory experiment that participants work 
longer and earn more if they set higher targets. Gill and Prowse (2012) conduct a real effort, 
competitive laboratory experiment and find individual loss aversion around endogenous targets. 
After showing that individuals are responsive to prospective reference points and that myopic 
behavior is sensitive to manipulation, we might find positive results when introducing targets to a 
Myopic Loss Aversion experiment. My thesis explores the research question “Is the equity premium 
puzzle just a lack of foresight?” by conducting this novel extension of Gneezy and Potters (1997).  
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3. Methodology: Laboratory experiment 
To assess the impact of targeting on Myopic Loss Aversion, a laboratory experiment was 
designed, planned and conducted at Nova SBE. The experiment consisted of eighteen lotteries 
structured in three parts and is an extension of Gneezy and Potters' (1997) above described design, 
which is probably the most well-known and repeated experiment in the context of Myopic Loss 
Aversion. To benchmark this thesis with the current state of research, the first part focuses on 
replicating Myopic Loss Aversion within the experiment. Participants were therefore split into one 
high-frequency and one low-frequency feedback group. They then received a fixed endowment per 
lottery over which they made a discrete investment decision with a positive expected return. 
Moving beyond existing literature, in a second and third part of the experiment two additional 
treatments were introduced. In part two, half of the participants were informed about the average 
expected return as an exogenous target and in part three all of them were given the choice to commit 
themselves to an endogenous, self-selected target. Compared to field experiments which had to 
infer reference points from behavior (Camerer et al., 1997) and previous laboratory experiments 
that explicitly ask for personal targets (Abeler et al., 2011; Gill and Prowse, 2012), in my design, I 
introduced exogenous reference points to the participants. By not relying on self-selected reference 
points his modification helped to overcome endogeneity issues of the previous targeting literature. 












First part: Lottery 1-6 Second part: Lottery 7-12 Third part: Lottery 13-18
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3.1. Participants  
Four experimental sessions were conducted from April 2nd to April 5th, 2018 at Nova SBE with 
a total of 79 students participating, 50.6% of which were female. Students were invited through a 
posting on “Facebook”. For each master’s program, an individual group existed on this social 
media platform, hence targeting every master’s student at Nova SBE equally by publishing the 
invitation. Participants were aged between 18 and 35, with a mean of 23.5 years. 88.6% of the 
participants already graduated from their bachelor while only 11.4% were undergraduates and took 
notice of the experiment through personal referrals. Due to the nature of the undertaking, two-thirds 
of the participants were economics students, while only one-third studied management or finance. 
Additionally, 27.8% of the participants attended a behavioral economics class during their studies. 
Further, 58% of the participants were Portuguese, while the rest consisted of diverse nationalities, 
including mainly German, Italian, Brazilian and Norwegian students. Table 6 in the appendix 
displays the population composition per treatment. Based on a Kruskal-Wallis distribution test, 
randomization of participants was only close to failing for study majors and nationalities.  
3.2. Experimental design 
After the start of the experiment, participants had to decide on their individual investment in a 
sequence of eighteen identical and independent lotteries structured in three parts of six lotteries. In 
every round, participants received an endowment of 10 experimental credit units (ECUs), on which 
they had to decide in discrete steps (only full ECUs) which amount they wanted to invest in each 
lottery. The part of the endowment not invested was added to their payoff after the experiment. As 
it was not allowed to accumulate endowments over several lotteries, the maximum investment per 
lottery was 10 ECUs. Every lottery had a 2/3 probability of losing this amount and a 1/3 probability 
of winning 2.5 times the investment, creating a positive expected return. Participants were informed 
before the experiment about these winning and losing probabilities and the corresponding payoffs.  
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The first twelve lotteries of the experiment focused on two different manipulations that have 
been tested in four different treatments: Treatment H (“high-frequency information”) vs. treatment 
L (“low-frequency information”) was introduced before the first lottery, whereas treatment T 
(“suggestion of an exogenous target”) vs. treatment N (“no suggestion of an exogenous target”) 
was added before lottery seven. In the first manipulation under treatment H, the participants played 
the lotteries one by one. Before lottery one, they had to choose how much of their endowment of 
10 ECUs to bet in the lottery and were informed about the realization of the lottery afterward. Next, 
they could decide on how much of their second endowment of again 10 ECUs to bet for lottery 
two, and so on. Hence, in this treatment participants made six betting decisions over the course of 
the first part of the experiment. In treatment L, participants played the lotteries in blocks of three 
with investments restricted to be equal in order to mimic a single decision. At the beginning of 
lottery one, subjects decided how much of their 10 ECUs endowment to bet in lottery one, two, 
and three. After participants committed to their investments, they were informed about the 
realizations for this bundle of lotteries and were thus not able to assign a gain or loss to a particular 
lottery, but rather to the combined result. This was repeated for lotteries four, five and six. The idea 
behind the design of the two treatments was to manipulate the evaluation period: In treatment L, 
both the frequency of choice and the information feedback were lower than in treatment H and thus 
participants were expected to evaluate the outcome of their allocation more aggregated. If they 
were myopic loss averse, they should have refused to invest more in the high-frequency lotteries. 
In the second part of the experiment, half of the participants from both information frequency 
treatments were informed before lottery seven, that the expected return over an evaluation period 
of six lotteries was 70 ECUs when betting the entire endowment. Participants were told that they 
could consider following this exogenous target but whether or not they reached it had no further 
consequences. The other half of the participants served as a control group and didn’t receive this 
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information, leading to the four different treatment groups HxT (“high-frequency information and 
exogenous target”), HxN (“high-frequency information and no target”), LxT (“low-frequency 
information and target”) and LxN (“low-frequency information and no target”). Assuming rational 
investment strategies, neither information frequency nor the provision of an exogenous target 
should affect individual behavior and participants would bet their full endowment every lottery. 
However, both the theory on reference points, where individuals evaluate gains and losses not 
based on their absolute value but rather related to a usually self-selected benchmark as well as the 
empirical results following Camerer et al. (1997) let us expect that participants would be affected 
by targets and decide differently. Advantageous over their applied endogenous reference points, an 
exogenous target might affect individual behavior efficiently and free of endogeneity issues. 
Further, the effect of an extension of the evaluation period could potentially be stronger than the 
impact Myopic Loss Aversion, making participants invest more (less) of their endowment in the 
remaining lotteries, should they realize a short-falling (overshooting) of this target.  
Finally, before the third part of the experiment, all participants were also encouraged to commit 
themselves to an endogenous, self-selected target for lotteries thirteen to eighteen. They were 
informed that if they selected a target, hitting or overshooting it will reward them with a bonus of 
5% on exactly the target amount, while failing to do so will not result in a reward but leave the rest 
of their return untouched. The bonus size itself was chosen to be relevant to make participants 
actually think about what they could potentially reach yet sufficiently small in order to not distort 
their behavior and incentivize them to invest more in every lottery just to reach the bonus payment. 
Additionally, with an endogenous target in the third part, the impact of a previous exogenous target 
on the former can be tested. Assuming rational investment strategies, no change in behavior should 
be observed and participants with perfect foresight should set their endogenous target equivalent 
to an exogenous target of 70 ECUs while adopting a corresponding investment strategy (i.e. invest 
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the full endowment of 10 ECUs every lottery). Assuming differences across participants (based on 
their experience, demographics and information frequency), the size of the endogenous target 
might vary and could have a different impact compared to the exogenous target in part two. 
3.3. Remuneration and participant incentives 
Unlike the initial experiment by Gneezy and Potters (1997), the earned ECUs were not directly 
converted into real money after the experiment. Instead, they worked as lottery tickets to win a 
monetary reward with chances strictly increasing in the ECUs earned relatively to the other 
participants. 25€ were therefore available for each of the four treatments groups, as in accordance 
with the experiment’s theory the payoffs between the treatment groups were expected to be 





In order to further increase individual engagement, drinks were prepared as a show-up bonus and 
ECUs could be performance dependent converted into sweets and fruits after the experiment: A 
chocolate bar, an apple or a banana were available for 60, a cookie or a peach for 20 and five 
gummy bears or nuts for 5 ECUs. Therefore, the total ECUs were rounded to the next full five. 
3.4. Experimental procedure 
Four experiment sessions (one per sub-treatment HxT, HxN, LxT, LxN) were administrated in 
a classroom by pen and paper with participants seated sufficiently far apart. An assistant supported 
the conduct of the experiment by distributing the instructions and related questionnaires to the 
participants upon their arrival. After the procedure was explained by the experimenter, participants 
could examine the instructions privately, record their ID on the questionnaire and ask questions. 
Participants were then instructed to record their first bets. Win letters randomly placed on top of 
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the questionnaire determined their win or loss in every lottery with an almost equal number of 
participants assigned to win letter A, B or C. To determine the lottery outcome, three balls marked 
with A, B or C were drawn from a bag. After participants recorded their lottery investment, the ball 
which determined the winning letter for every lottery was drawn. If a participant’s win letter did 
(did not) match the letter on the ball, he or she won (lost) the lottery. As only one of the three balls 
matched a participant’s win letter the probability of winning (losing) a lottery was 1/3 (2/3). For 
the high-frequency treatment, the selected ball was put back before the draw for the next lottery 
happened. The same procedure was repeated three times in a row for the low-frequency treatment.  
After every lottery under high-frequency and every third lottery under low-frequency treatment 
participants calculated and recorded their earnings on the questionnaire. These calculations were 
checked by the experimenter in order to avoid cheating and to ensure that everyone understood the 
procedure. Before each of the three experiment parts, participants were informed about changes in 
the modalities. After lottery eighteen, participants were asked to sum up the three parts and their 
bonus (in case they reached their endogenous target). When setting their own target for the third 
part, participants had to note it down on their questionnaire before lottery thirteen. For those 
affected, the exogenous target was printed on the questionnaire stating the optionality to follow. 
3.5. Predicted behavior: Theoretical model 
 Assuming that they are affected by Myopic Loss Aversion, participants weight a loss of x higher 
than an equal gain of x, illustrated by a weight of λ > 1 in accordance with Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) and Gneezy and Potters (1997). An individual investment utility function can thus be: 
With	𝐸<𝑈*(𝑥)> as an aggregated distribution value of all independent lottery draws in treatment i, 
the expected utility for a participant under the high-frequency treatment for an investment x is thus: 
𝑈(𝑥) = 	 ? 𝑥 𝑖𝑓	𝑥 ≥ 0−𝜆𝑥 𝑖𝑓	𝑥 < 0 
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which is for a positive x and any 𝜆G 	≤ 1.25 greater than 0. When comparing to the low-frequency  
information treatment where the outcome is evaluated only every third period, the expected utility:  
of the invested part of the endowment is again greater than 0 for a positive x and any λI 	≤ 1.56. 
When half of the participants are asked in the second part of the experiment to follow the expected 
return as an exogenous target, the evaluation period for both the affected high and low-frequency 
























which is again greater than 0 for a positive x and any 𝜆J ≤ 1.84, allowing even more loss aversion. 
According to this theoretical model, a longer evaluation period tolerates a higher loss aversion that 
still allows a positive investment in every lottery. A necessary assumption behind this theory is, 
that Langer and Weber (2008) and not Bellemare et al. (2005) holds and that Myopic Loss Aversion 
is driven by the evaluation period and rather than commitment. Assuming sufficient computational 
skills, participants that evaluate their decisions over a prolonged period could thus diminish their 
loss averse behavior and profit from an increase in expected return (since the latter is positive). 
When participants set their own target in part three, they evaluate again the λ-adjusted expected 
return over six lotteries but now also receive a potential bonus q on their endogenous target T:  
𝐸<𝑈U(𝑥)> = 	 V
𝐸<𝑈J(𝑥)> + 𝑞𝑇 𝑖𝑓	𝐸(𝑥) ≥ 𝑇
𝐸<𝑈J(𝑥)> 𝑖𝑓	𝐸(𝑥) < 𝑇
 
This is done by a small fixed percentage addition of q%, that should be of a real size yet still 






















but not externally incentivize them to target higher they feel reasonable just by an additional effect 
of the reward itself. Applying a presumably non-distorting 5% bonus on the exact commitment, 
the expected utility with a target around an expected mean return is again a positive value for all 
𝜆U ≤ 1.88, allowing only for a marginally higher loss aversion than under the exogenous target.  
After considering loss aversion under different evaluation periods, the question arises how 
much of their endowment participants are expected to invest in each lottery. Under risk neutrality, 
the entire endowment would be invested due to the lottery’s positive expected return. Not observing 
this in the previous experiments, it is most plausible to compare only the investment difference 
between treatments. Based on the previously determined loss aversion weights 𝜆*, projections are: 
Figure 2 can be interpreted along the following figurative example: Assume that there is a 
population of 100 individuals with loss aversion coefficients of different magnitude and uniformly 
distributed from 1.00 to 2.00. Then 25% (𝜆G = 1.25) of the overall endowment of this population 
will be invested under the high-frequency treatment, 56% (𝜆I = 1.56) will be invested under a low 
frequency-treatment, and 84% (𝜆J = 1.84) or 88% (𝜆U  = 1.88) will be invest with an exogenous or 
endogenous target. Yet the invested endowment increases sizeable when changing from a high-
frequency to a low-frequency treatment (24.8%) or from either one an exogenous target (47.2% 
and 17.9% respectively), the change within the two target types is at 2.2% rather neglectable and 
in practice probably non-distortive. If the real 𝜆* is smaller than 𝜆I, we should not see an effect of 
targeting on the low-frequency participants as only the high-frequency participants will catch up.  
Figure 2: Projected change in invested endowment for different degrees of Loss Aversion 
  𝜆I (1.56) 𝜆J  (1.84) 𝜆U (1.88) 
𝜆G (1.25)  24.8% 47.2% 50.4% 
𝜆I (1.56)  17.9% 20.5% 
𝜆J  (1.84)  2.2% 
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4. Experimental results: The impact of targeting on Myopic Loss Aversion 
In the following descriptive analysis, the endowment invested per experiment part and in blocks 
of three lotteries, is compared across the four different sub-treatments. Table 1 presents the average 
invested endowment per treatment as well as the related Mann–Whitney distribution test results.  
In order to draw comparisons between and within the three experiment parts that go beyond 
descriptive results, repeated OLS estimations are performed: Part-based with variables aggregated 
over six lotteries (Table 2) and block-based with an aggregation over three lotteries (Table 7 in the 
appendix). While the former is the focus of the analysis, the latter serves as a minimum aggregation 
level as participants under low-frequency feedback are forced to invest three lotteries ahead. OLS 
is preferred over fixed effects with regressors varying within the experiment and further necessary 
due to an otherwise low validity of a panel data model with only 79 participants. Yet a Hausman 
test rejects heteroskedasticity (1% level), estimations use clustered standard errors on a participant 
level to account for the fact that individual investments are not independent between lotteries.  




Invested Endowment  Mann-Whitney z (ECUs with STDEV italic below) (two-tailed significance levels with p-values italic below) 
LxT LxN HxT HxN 
 
LxT|LxN HxT|HxN LxT|HxT LxN|HxN LxN|HxT LxT|HxN 
.           
Part 1 5.974 5.976 4.517 4.184 0.273 0.253 1.704 2.173 1.740 2.270 
 2.870 2.981 3.187 2.875 0.785 0.800 0.088 0.030 0.082 0.023 
.           
Lotteries  
1-3 
5.789 5.905 4.117 3.947 0.222 0.155 -1.816 2.137 1.811 -2.148 
2.955 3.177 3.405 2.976 0.825 0.877 0.069 0.033 0.070 0.032 
.           
Lotteries  
4-6 
6.158 6.048 4.917 4.421 -0.027 -0.634 -1.172 1.742 1.245 -1.808 
3.060 3.025 3.156 3.071 0.978 0.526 0.241 0.082 0.213 0.071 
.           
.           
Part 2 6.289 6.333 6.458 4.474 0.123 1.917 -0.142 2.052 -0.211 1.698 
 3.114 2.763 3.275 2.661 0.902 0.055 0.887 0.040 0.833 0.090 
.           
Lotteries  
7-9 
5.947 6.048 6.317 4.281 0.206 -2.005 0.483 1.686 -0.238 -1.422 
3.358 3.201 3.132 2.542 0.837 0.045 0.629 0.092 0.812 0.155 
.           
Lotteries 
10-12 
6.632 6.619 6.600 4.667 -0.028 -1.727 0.115 2.100 -0.186 -1.879 
2.967 2.519 3.752 3.008 0.978 0.084 0.908 0.036 0.853 0.060 
.           
.           
Part 3 6.289 6.071 6.15 4.316 -0.343 1.790 0.086 1.725 0.013 1.890 
 3.501 2.874 3.356 2.695 0.732 0.074 0.932 0.085 0.990 0.059 
.           
Lotteries 
13-15 
6.053 6.190 6.250 4.228 0.028 -1.949 0.115 2.002 -0.093 -1.441 
3.763 3.172 3.310 2.706 0.978 0.051 0.909 0.045 0.926 0.150 
.           
Lotteries 
16-18 
6.526 5.952 6.050 4.404 -0.622 -1.580 -0.418 1.413 -0.158 -1.883 
3.747 3.138 3.662 3.018 0.534 0.114 0.676 0.158 0.874 0.060 
.           
.           
N 19 21 20 19 40 39 39 40 41 38 
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4.1. First part: Testing of Myopic Loss Aversion 
In the first part, I replicate Gneezy and Potters (1997) by comparing average investments under 
high-frequency (HxT, HxN) and low-frequency information (LxT, LxN). The investment within 
the same feedback frequency is not significantly different (Table 1), rejecting the distribution test 
null hypothesis, both, by part and in blocks of three lotteries. When comparing investments 
between feedback frequencies, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10% level in all four part-
based tests as well as in six of eight block-based tests, which might attributable to the small sample.  





(ECUs with standard errors italic below; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Dependent variable: Investment 𝐼*3 
Information Frequency Only 
  
+Targeting (Future RP) 
Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 
.       
Low-frequency information 1.620** 0.821 0.919 1.620** 1.860** 1.496 0.669 0.678 0.709 0.669 0.858 0.929 
.       
Interaction term low-frequency 
information with exogenous target 
- - - - -2.029 -1.396 
    1.335 1.393 
.       
Exogenous target in part 2 - - - - 1.985** 1.362     0.953 1.020 
.       
Endogenous target size in part 3 - - - - - 0.035*      0.019 
.       
Constant 4.355*** 5.491*** 5.256*** 4.355*** 4.474*** 2.488* 0.481 0.499 0.505 0.481 0.610 1.202 
       
       
Retrospective RP controls No No No No No No 
       
Demographic controls No No No No No No 
.       
. .      
R-squared 0.0719 0.0187 0.0213 0.0719 0.0728 0.1013 
       
Dependent variable: Investment 𝐼*3 
+Retrospective Reference Points +Demographics Control 
Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 
       
Low-frequency information 1.620** 1.588* 1.616* 1.515** 1.453 1.543 0.699 0.922 0.954 0.688 1.026 1.014 
.       
Interaction term low-frequency 
information with exogenous target 
- -1.775 -1.505 - -1.833 -1.234 
 1.389 1.407  1.541 1.518 
.       
Exogenous target in part 2 - 1.998** 1.329 - 2.182** 1.646  0.963 1.033  1.114 1.179 
.       
Endogenous target size in part 3 - - 0.035* - - 0.028   0.019   0.021 
.       
Female - - - -1.383** -1.548** -0.944    0.688 0.690 0.739 
.       
Constant 4.355*** 4.562*** 1.860 8.138** 6.578 1.779 0.481 0.894 1.775 3.411 4.032 4.327 
       
       
Retrospective RP controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Demographic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
.       
.       
R-squared 0.0719 0.0777 0.1073 0.1527 0.1732 0.1906 
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 For empirical testing, the invested endowment 𝐼*3 of individual i in part t, is regressed on low 
frequency treatment dummy 𝐿, a time constant vector of demographic controls 𝜁* (age, gender, 
nationality, studies, behavioral economic experience) and in the block-based case also on 𝑅*3,a set 
of retrospective reference points (successful previous lotteries and overall accumulated earnings): 
𝐼*3 = 𝛽` + 𝛽a𝐿 + 𝛽b𝑅*3 + 𝛽c𝜁* + 𝑢*3 (I) 
When including low-frequency information as the only explanatory variable, the result of the point 
estimator is significant at the 5% level for the first part only (Table 2), while the constant is 
significant at the 1% level for all three parts, thus matching the descriptive results. Though size and 
direction of both the constant and the low-frequency treatment are matching the descriptive results, 
the explanatory power of the model is rather low for all three experiment parts. Testing block-based 
(Table 7), the effect of low-frequency information is larger and more significant for lotteries one 
to three than four to six with the explanatory power of the model remaining unchanged. Based on 
the clear results of the first part, Myopic Loss Aversion is assumed to be evident in this experiment. 
4.2. Second part: The impact of an exogenous target on Myopic Loss Aversion 
After introducing the exogenous target in the second part, the invested endowment increases 
strongly for the affected high-frequency information participants compared to the previous part and 
the other groups. This is best described as a “complete catching up” of participants affected by 
high-frequency information feedback with their low-frequency information peers. These results 
also support Langer and Weber (2008) who argue that Myopic Loss Aversion is driven by the 
evaluation period rather than by commitment. Yet this should be carefully evaluated since they use 
a slightly different experimental design. As there is no increased investment observed for the low-
frequency feedback group, the true loss aversion 𝜆* of the theoretical model might actually be 
smaller than 𝜆I (1.56). An implication of this insight could be that individual foresight actually 
goes beyond a preassigned lottery evaluation period. Differences in the investment size between 
and within treatments are mostly significant at the 10% level for both part and block-based testing.  
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Empirically, regression I is extended by the effect of the exogenous target 𝛽e. Block-based, the 
impact of a potential short-falling 𝛽f is additionally included, with 𝑆*3 indicating the earnings from 
lottery seven to nine (in case of significance, loss aversion around a target might be underlying):  
𝐼*3 = 𝛽` + 𝛽a𝐿 + 𝛽b𝑅*3 + 𝛽c𝜁* + 𝛽e𝑇 + 𝛽h𝑇𝐿 + 𝛽f(𝑇 − 𝑆*3) + 𝑢*3 (II) 
For the second part of the experiment, a significant effect (5% level) of the exogenous target is 
observed, making affected participants invest on average almost two ECUs more than their peers. 
After adding the exogenous target, size and significance (5% level) of the low-frequency feedback 
treatment, as well as the explanatory power of the model for part two, also increase. Testing block-
based, the exogenous target effect is prevalent only for lotteries seven to nine, while the impact of 
feedback frequency remains unchanged. Yet both impact and size of the low-frequency treatment 
increased for part two, this should not be overinterpreted, as the size of its interaction term with the 
target is indicative that this effect is reversed for the “LxT” treatment group. Without a significant 
distance-to-target effect, loss aversion around an exogenous target cannot be supported (Table 7). 
4.3. Third part: The impact of an endogenous target on Myopic Loss Aversion 
In the third part, when participants are encouraged to follow a self-selected, endogenous target, 
the average investment does not change significantly compared to the previous parts. Comparing 
the size of the endogenous target set between high frequency (58.3) and low frequency (62.2) 
participants, no significant difference is observed between them, though it is at the 5% level when 
comparing between those who had an exogenous target before (55.3) and those who have not had 
(65.3). 76 of 79 participants did not feel any discouragement and selected an exogenous target, of 
which 46 reached their goal and received the corresponding bonus. Yet differences between the 
treatments do not change significantly to the second part, when testing part-based, more significant 
differences are lost when testing block-based. With most significance losses happening in the last 
lottery block, the two types of targets might work differently, not least as an endogenous target is 
apparently not enough for those treated with “HxT” to catch up with their peers in the third part. 
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In the last step, regression II is extended by the endogenous target size, while keeping the 
exogenous target T as a control. In the block-based case, similar to regression II, from lotteries 
sixteen to eighteen, the model is again extended by the impact of a potential target short falling 𝛽i: 
𝐼*3 = 𝛽` + 𝛽a𝐿 + 𝛽b𝑅*3 + 𝛽c𝜁* + 𝛽e𝑇 + 𝛽h𝑇𝐿 + 𝛽f𝐶* + 𝛽i(𝐶* − 𝑆*3) + 𝜀*3 (III) 
Part-based testing shows that on a 10% significance level, the investment per lottery in the third 
part increases by 0.035 ECUs for each ECU higher endogenous target size chosen. Similar to the 
exogenous target, this effect is stronger and more significant (5% level) for lotteries thirteen to 
fifteen but insignificant for lotteries sixteen to eighteen when testing block-based. One possible 
explanation for both significance losses could be that individuals lose sight on their target when 
being influenced by realized outcomes and thus should be remembered repeatedly about them. An 
additional beneficial trait of the endogenous target is also a gender-specific effect, as an otherwise 
persistent higher female loss aversion disappears in part three. Despite not entirely replicating the 
descriptive results without applying additional controls, results are confirmative that an exogenous 
target helps to overcome Myopic Loss Aversion while an endogenous target alone is not sufficient. 
With a significant impact of the endogenous target size on the investment, it should also be of 
interest what determines the commitment. Equation IV regresses the endogenous target size 𝐶* on 
the feedback frequency 𝐿, the exogenous target T, previous earnings 𝛱* and demographics 𝜁*: 
𝐶* = 𝛽` + 𝛽a𝐿+𝛽b𝜁* + 𝛽c𝑇 + 𝛽e𝛱* + 𝜀* (IV) 
Yet, the exogenous target does not have a direct impact on the investment in the third part under 
part-based testing, there is however an impact at the 1% significance level on the endogenous target 
size but no significant impact of the feedback frequency (Table 3). Those provided in part two with 
an exogenous target on average aim over nine ECUs higher in the third part, and thus come closer 
to the exogenous target size of 70 ECUs. Significant at the 1% level, women target almost eleven 
ECUs less than their male peers, which will be further discussed in the robustness check section. 
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Besides a lucky streak, the probability of reaching the endogenous target 𝐸𝑅* might also depend 
on further individual traits, including most of the previous dependent and independent variables. 
This question is analyzed by a probit model and benchmarked with a linear probability model:  
𝐸𝑅* = 𝛽` + 𝛽a𝐿+𝛽b𝜁* + 𝛽c𝑇 + 𝛽e𝛱* + 𝛽h𝐶* + 𝛽f𝐼*̅ + 𝜀* (V) 
Interpreting the marginal effect at means of the probit model (Table 4), chances for those treated 
by high-frequency feedback reaching the endogenous target increase by 24% when provided with 
an exogenous target before but decrease by 10% (24%-34%) for those affected by low-frequency 
feedback previously, which could be related to the different evaluation horizons of the two groups. 
Also, participants with higher earnings in the previous parts of the experiment are less likely to 
reach their target. This could be explained by overconfident behavior caused by previous success. 





Dependent variable:  
Endogenous target size 𝐶*3 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Point Estimator (absolute ECUs) Robust Standard Error 
..   
Low-frequency information 2.915 4.070 
.   
Exogenous target in part 2 9.323** 3.612 
.   
Female -10.550*** 3.636 
.   
Constant 81.792** 37.236 
.   
. .  
Retrospective RP controls Yes 
  








OLS Estimations  Probit Estimations (MEAM) 
Dependent variable:  
Probability of bonus reached 𝐸𝑅*   
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Point Estimator  Robust SE  Point Estimator  Robust SE 
     
Average investment in part 3 -0.012 0.020 -0.009 0.016 
.     
Low-frequency information 0.047 0.156 0.007 0.159 
.     
Low-freq. information/exog. target -0.374 0.229 -0.339* 0.198 
..     
Exogenous target in part 2 0.217 0.181 0.241* 0.140 
.     
Endogenous target size in part 3 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
.     
Total previous earnings -0.006*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.002 
.     
Constant 1.504** 0.670 - - 
.     
   
Retrospective RP controls Yes Yes 
   
Demographic controls Yes Yes 
   
R-squared 0.2614 0.2527 (pseudo-R-squared) 
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4.4. Robustness checks 
The following section discusses the robustness of feedback frequency and reference points for 
different controls. While the early literature (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Bellemare et al., 2005) 
mainly argued based on descriptive results, later authors (Haigh and List, 2005; Fellner and Sutter, 
2009; Hopfensitz and Wranik, 2008) control for robustness by OLS and fixed effect estimations. 
4.4.1. Retrospective reference points 
As a first robustness check, retrospective reference points have been included. Participants 
might not only be affected by their expectations but also by their previous experiences. Hopfensitz 
(2009) finds in the context of Myopic Loss Aversion evidence for a Gamblers Fallacy, a behavioral 
bias when individual investment is increased after favorable results of previous lotteries. In my 
experiment though, I cannot detect an impact of previously accumulated earnings on any testing 
level. Surprisingly I observe a Reversed Gamblers Fallacy (Table 7), with significantly lower 
investments in the first part after successful previous lotteries: It might be that economics students 
assess the probability of consecutive successful lotteries differently or that individual targeting 
behavior actually exists, and individuals prefer riskless savings when the target is within reach. Yet 
they are mostly insignificant, controlling for retrospective reference points improves the model’s 
explanatory power while decreasing size and significance of the feedback frequency for lotteries 
four to twelve, underlining the varsity of effects that determine individual investment decisions. 
4.4.2. Demographic characteristics 
With most of the literature applying fixed effect models, little is known about the impact of 
demographic traits on the investment. Following Table 6 in the appendix, individual characteristics 
are randomly distributed across treatments. When accounting for them, one of the most interesting 
insights of my research is that women not only target lower before the third part, as already 
mentioned but also invest around 1.5 ECUs less over the first two parts while only catching up with 
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their male peers in part three. Empirically, a higher female loss aversion is among others confirmed 
by Schmidt and Traub (2002). Decreasing female loss aversion is probably the biggest advantage 
of the exogenous target over the exogenous one. Further, the model is robust for other demographic 
traits and increased in explanatory power. Not least, when testing block-based after applying all 
controls, with a significant distance-to-endogenous target effect, results are speculative for a loss 
aversion around an individual endogenous target, supporting the proposal of Camerer et al. (1997). 
4.4.3. Endogeneity issues in the third part 
 As participants that invest more logically also aim for a higher return, endogeneity caused by 
reverse causality between the endogenous target and the investment size might be observed. A 
solution at hand for this is an instrumental variable approach using the exogenous target from the 
second part to exactly identify the former. Since there is no significant impact of the exogenous 
target on the investment size in the third part, exogeneity of the instrument is evident. Knowing 
from previous results (Table 4) that the exogenous target significantly impacts the endogenous 
target size, the necessary instrumental relevance is also presumed. Coefficients, however, remain 
insignificant (though they change in size) when performing the 2SLS estimation (Table 5). Further, 
a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test fails to reject exogeneity null hypothesis of the endogenous target size, 
hence the endogenous target size is – against the meaning of its name – not entirely endogenous. 
Despite different target sizes, a “common sense” between the treatments might be not too far apart. 




2SLS Estimations  OLS Estimations 
Dependent variable: Investment 𝐼*3 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Absolute ECUs Robust SE Absolute ECUs Robust SE 
..     
Low-frequency information 0.762 1.122 1.543 1.014 
.     
Low-freq. information|exog. target -0.346 1.539 -1.116 1.528 
     
Exogenous Target in part 2 Instrument for the endogenous target size 1.683 1.116 
.     
Endogenous target size in part 3 0.168 0.111 0.027 0.022 
.     
Constant -8.818 11.040 2.243 4.327 
.     
. .    
Retrospective RP controls Yes Yes 
   
Demographic controls Yes Yes 
   
R-squared - 0.1788 
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis presented a behavioral economic laboratory experiment on the impact of prospective 
reference points on Myopic Loss Aversion and was conducted with 79 students at Nova SBE. 
Following a design based on Gneezy and Potters (1997), I added insights on targeting behavior 
discovered by Camerer et al. (1997) to the original experiment. In line with the literature, evidence 
for Myopic Loss Aversion was found through a treatment with different information frequencies. 
Assigning the exogenous target only to a part of the participants, the goal was to assess whether 
an artificially prolonged evaluation period helps individuals to invest more of their endowment in 
the lottery. Consequently, I showed that those affected by high-frequency feedback and provided 
with an exogenous target in the second part managed to completely catch up with the low-frequency 
feedback group. Against predictions of the theoretical model, the latter did not increase their 
investment, giving room to speculate that there might be some kind of individual foresight. My 
results can also carefully be interpreted to support Langer and Weber's (2008) findings, who show 
that in fact the evaluation period drives Myopic Loss Aversion and not the commitment horizon. 
Those who previously have had an exogenous target also selected a higher endogenous target 
and are more likely to reach it, supporting the hypothesis that prospective reference points reduce 
Myopic Loss Aversion. Yet an endogenous target is not enough to overcome myopic behavior, it 
helps to surpass an otherwise persistent female loss aversion, though they still target less than men. 
After including demographics and retrospective reference points, I find evidence supporting loss 
aversion around the endogenous target, which is – against the implications of its name – exogenous.  
Though the effect of targeting is pointing towards the hypothesized direction, it is important to 
note that like in all laboratory experiments, issues of external validity might remain with both the 
endowment type and the participant group not being representative, leaving room to repeat the 
setup with more participants, a real monetary endowment or in a context outside of the university. 
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If the proposed effects are valid and Myopic Loss Aversion is truly reduced by prospective 
reference points, agents invested in assets with varying evaluation periods should be encouraged 
to assess their investment strategy rather based on its contribution to a long-term goal than on recent 
developments. This insight could help not only managers to guide their investment professionals 
in the evaluation of financial returns but also policymakers to provide such targets to their citizens 
when designing private pension and healthcare saving plans. The results of this experiment suggest 
that the equity premium puzzle can be partially solved by applying more individual foresight. 
6. Literature 
Abeler, Johannes, Armin Falk, Lorenz Goette, and 
David Huffman. 2011. “Reference Points and 
Effort Provision.” American Economic Review 
101 (2): 470–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.470. 
Bellemare, Charles, Michaela Krause, Sabine Kröger, 
and Chendi Zhang. 2005. “Myopic Loss 
Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment 
Flexibility.” Economics Letters 87 (3): 319–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.12.011. 
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard Thaler. 1995. 
“Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity 
Premium Puzzle.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 110 (1): 73–92. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2118511. 
Beshears, John, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and 
Brigitte C. Madrian. 2017. “Does Aggregated 
Returns Disclosure Increase Portfolio Risk 
Taking?” Review of Financial Studies 30 (6): 
1971–2005. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw086. 
Camerer, Colin, Linda Babcock, George 
Loewenstein, and Richard Thaler. 1997. “Labor 
Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day 
at a Time.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112 (2): 407–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555244. 
Crawford, Vincent P, and Juanjuan Meng. 2011. 
“New York City Cabdrivers ’ Labor Supply 
Revisited : Reference-Dependent Preferences 
with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours 
and Income.” American Economic Review 101 
(5): 1912–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.1912. 
Doran, Kirk. 2014. “Are Long-Term Wage 
Elasticities of Labor Supply More Negative 
than Short-Term Ones?” Economics Letters 122 
(2). Elsevier B.V.: 208–10. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.023. 
Eriksen, Kristoffer W., and Ola Kvaløy. 2010a. “Do 
Financial Advisors Exhibit Myopic Loss 
Aversion?” Financial Markets and Portfolio 
Management 24 (2): 159–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11408-009-0124-z. 
———. 2010b. “Myopic Investment Management.” 
Review of Finance 14 (3): 521–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp019. 
Farber, Henry S. 2005. “Is Tomorrow Another Day? 
The Labor Supply of New York City 
Cabdrivers.” Journal of Political Economy 113 
(1): 46–82. https://doi.org/10.1086/426040. 
———. 2008. “Reference-Dependent Preferences 
and Labor Supply: The Case of New York City 
Taxi Drivers.” American Economic Review 98 
(3): 1069–82. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.1069. 
Fehr, Ernst, and Lorenz Goette. 2007. “Do Workers 
Work More If Wages Are High? Evidence from 
a Randomized Field Do Workers Work More If 
Wages Are High? Evidence from a 
Randomized Field Experiment.” The American 
Economic Review 97 (1): 298–317. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.1.298. 
Fellner, Gerlinde, and Matthias Sutter. 2009. “Causes, 
Consequences, and Cures of Myopic Loss 
Aversion–An Experimental Investigation.” The 
Economic Journal 119 (537): 900–916. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0297.2009.02251.x. 
Gill, David, and Victoria Prowse. 2012. “A Structural 
Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real 
Effort Competition.” American Economic 
Review 102 (1): 469–503. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.469. 
Gneezy, Uri, Arie Kapteyn, and Jan Potters. 2003. 
“Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a 




Gneezy, Uri, and Jan Potters. 1997. “An Experiment 
on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods.” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (2): 631–
45. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555217. 
Haigh, Michael S, and John A List. 2005. “Do 
Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss 
Aversion? An Experimental Analysis.” The 
Journal of Finance 60 (1): 523–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6261.2005.00737.x. 
Heijden, Eline van der, Tobias J. Klein, Wieland 
Müller, and Jan Potters. 2012. “Framing Effects 
and Impatience: Evidence from a Large Scale 
Experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 84 (2). Elsevier B.V.: 701–
11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.017. 
Hopfensitz, Astrid. 2009. “Previous Outcomes and 
Reference Dependence : A Meta Study of 
Repeated Investment Tasks with and without 
Restricted Feedback.” TSE Working Paper 
Series. Vol. 87. 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/tsewpaper/22
194.htm. 
Hopfensitz, Astrid, and Tanja Wranik. 2008. 
“Psychological and Environmental 
Determinants of Myopic Loss Aversion.” 
MPRA Working Paper. http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/9305/1/MPRA_paper_9305.pdf. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. 
“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk.” Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society 47 (3): 263–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-
7150.2011.00774.x. 
———. 1984. “Choices, Values, and Frames.” 
American Psychologist, no. 39: 341–50. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341. 
Köszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. 2006. “A 
Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 152 (4): 1133–
65. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt005.Advance. 
Langer, Thomas, and Martin Weber. 2008. “Does 
Commitment or Feedback Influence Myopic 
Loss Aversion?. An Experimental Analysis.” 
Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 67 (3–4): 810–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.019. 
Mehra, Rajnish, and Edward C. Prescott. 1985. “The 
Equity Premium: A Puzzle.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 15 (2): 145–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(85)90061-3. 
Pope, Devin G., and Maurice E. Schweitzer. 2011. “Is 
Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in 
the Face of Experience, Competition, and High 
Stakes.” American Economic Review 101 (1): 
129–57. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.129. 
Schmidt, Ulrich, and Stefan Traub. 2002. “An 
Experimental Test of Loss Aversion.” The 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 25 (3): 233–
49. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020923921649. 
Sutter, Matthias. 2007. “Are Teams Prone to Myopic 
Loss Aversion? An Experimental Study on 
Individual versus Team Investment Behavior.” 
Economics Letters 97 (2): 128–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.031. 
Thaler, Richard, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, 
and Alan Schwartz. 1997. “The Effect of 
Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An 
Experimental Test.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112 (2): 647–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555226. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. 
“Advances in Prospect-Theory - Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty.” Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty 5 (4): 297–323. 
https://doi.org/Doi 10.1007/Bf00122574. 
7. Appendix 
7.1. Additional statistical tables 
Table 6: Distribution of demographic characteristics over the four treatment groups 
  
 
LxT (STDEV) LxN (STDEV) HxT (STDEV) HxN (STDEV) 
 
K-Wallis 𝝌𝟐 (p-value) 
.      
Female (100%) 0.47 (0.51) 0.48 (0.51) 0.50 (0.51) 0.57 (0.51) 0.4 (0.937) 
..      
Economic Studies (100%) 0.89 (0.31) 0.52 (0.51) 0.50 (0.51) 0.74 (0.45) 6.1 (0.107) 
.      
Graduate degree (100%) 0.84 (0.37) 1.00 (0.00) 0.85 (0.36) 0.84 (0.37) 1.1 (0.777) 
.      
Portuguese (100%) 0.84 (0.37) 0.42 (0.51) 0.60 (0.50) 0.47 (0.51) 6.0 (0.114) 
.      
Age 22.7 (2.2) 23.7 (1.2) 23.1 (2.5) 23.5 (3.6) 3.0 (0.398) 
.      
Behav. Econ. Course (100%) 0.37 (0.50) 0.19 (0.40) 0.35 (0.49) 0.21 (0.41) 1.5 (0.682) 
 




Dependent var.: Investment 𝐼*3 
 
OLS Estimations 
 (robust standard errors in italic; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Information frequency only 
L 1-3 L 4-6 L 7-9 L 10-12 L 13-15 L 16-18 
.       
Low-frequency information 1.816*** (0.698) 1.424** (0.685) 0.675 (0.702) 0.967 (0.706) 0.860 (0.741) 0.977 (0.769) 
.. 
      
Constant  4.034*** (0.506) 4.675*** (0.494) 5.325*** (0.481) 5.658***(0.561) 5.265*** (0.506) 5.248*** (0.548) 
 .             
       
Retrospective controls No No No No No No 
       
Demographic controls No No No No No No 
       
R-squared 0.0810 0.0532 0.0118 0.0240 0.0172 0.0206 
  
Dependent var.: Investment 𝐼*3 
+Targeting (Forward-looking RP) 
L 1-3 L 4-6 L 7-9 L 10-12 L 13-15 L 16-18 
       
Low-frequency information 1.816*** (0.698) 1.424** (0.685) 1.766* (0.910) 1.952** (0.888) 1.617 (0.980) 1.356 (0.955) 
..       
Low-freq. information/ex. target - - -2.136 (1.383) -2.011 (1.420) -1.866 (1.444) -0.964 (1.502) 
       
Exogenous target in part 2 - - 2.036** (0.911) 1.189 (1.654) 1.393 (1.005) 1.319 (1.104) 
       
Distance to exogenous target - - - 0.020 (0.032) - - 
       
Endogenous target size in part 3 - - - - 0.047** (0.021) 0.005 (0.023) 
       
Distance to endogenous target - - - - - 0.032 (0.021) 
       
Constant  4.034*** (0.506) 4.675*** (0.494) 4.280*** (0.582) 4.667*** (0.694) 1.791 (1.257) 3.415** (1.310) 
       
       
Retrospective controls No No No No No No 
       
Demographic controls No No No No No No 
       
R-squared 0.0810 0.0532 0.0651 0.0820 0.1250 0.0977 
  
Dependent var.: Investment 𝐼*3 
+Retrospective Reference Points 
L 1-3 L 4-6 L 7-9 L 10-12 L 13-15 L 16-18 
..       
Low-frequency information  1.782** (0.698) 0.715 (1.004) 2.074 (1.277) 2.058 (1.448) 1.571 (1.102) 0.507 (1.128) 
..       
Low-freq. information/ex. target - - -2.491 (1.748) -2.171 (1.401) -1.610 (1.700) -0.132 (1.566) 
       
Exogenous target in part 2 - - 2.110** (0.983) -0.145 (1.861) 1.905* (1.051) 1.116 (1.074) 
       
Distance to exogenous target - - - 0.062 (0.041) - - 
       
Endogenous target size in part 3 - - - - 0.058** (0.026) -0.031 (0.030) 
       
Distance to endogenous target - - - - - 0.093** (0.040) 
       
Success in previous lottery -0.897 (0.700) -1.831* (1.109) 0.221 (1.461) 0.540 (1.384) 0.258 (1.007) 0.002 (0.011) 
       
Constant 4.471*** (0.628) 5.727*** (1.085) 3.520 (2.379) 3.331 (2.377) 0.349 (1.884) 1.810 (2.384) 
.       
.       
Retrospective controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Demographic controls No No No No No No 
       
R-squared 0.1006 0.0976 0.0705 0.1043 0.1536 0.1454 
  
Dependent var.: Investment 𝐼*3 
+Demographic Controls 
L 1-3 L 4-6 L 7-9 L 10-12 L 13-15 L 16-18 
       
Low-frequency information 1.736*** (0.719) 0.368 (1.187) 1.970 (1.359) 1.883 (1.520) 1.775 (1.089) 0.604 (1.145) 
..       
Low-freq. information/ex. target - - -2.286 (1.898) -2.393 (1.515) -1.718 (1.688) 0.124 (1.502) 
       
Exogenous target in part 2 - - 2.223* (1.152) 0.963 (2.215) 2.672*** (1.122) 1.548 (1.184) 
       
Distance to exogenous target - - - 0.035 (0.046) - - 
       
Endogenous target size in part 3 - - - - 0.050* (0.021) -0.015 (0.026) 
       
Distance to endogenous target - - - - - 0.070* (0.038) 
       
Success in previous lottery -1.235* (0.744) -2.307* (1.234) 0.903 (1.522) 0.312 (1.507) 0.257 (1.070) -1.277 (1.112) 
       
Female -1.419** (0.722) -1.390* (0.727) 1.673*** (0.770) -1.563** (0.759) -0.675 (0.807) -0.935 (0.820) 
       
Constant 9.762** (4.178) 9.548** (4.801) 5.990 (0.529) 4.041 (4.550) 3.900 (4.740) 0.179 (4.803) 
.  
.       
Retrospective controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R-squared 0.1973 0.1941 0.1735 0.1845 0.2371 0.2517 
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7.2. Additional figures 
Figure 3: Development of the experimental history on Myopic Loss Aversion 
Authors Country (town) & method 
Observations 
High /Low #Rounds 
€ value of the 





paper and pencil 
41/42 students 12 0.90€ 
Baseline experiment, proof 
of the underlying of Myopic 
Loss Aversion (MLA) 
 





40/40 traders 15 0.90€ 
Under MLA market prices 
of risky financial assets are 
significantly higher 
 




44/44 students 9 0.70€ 
MLA is persistent even if the 
information frequency is 
disentangled from decision 
making 
 
Haigh and List 
(2005) 
US (University of 





9 0.80€ (students) 
3.20€ (traders) 
Professional traders exhibit 
MLA to a greater extent 
than students 
 




Team decision making 
reduces MLA but cannot 






54/53 students 30 
25€ for the entire 
experiment (self- 
allocation/lottery) 
If the feedback is separated 
from commitment, only the 






38/39 students 15 0.90€ 
MLA stronger when initial 






computer 30/30 students 18 0.5€ 
Both investment horizon 
and feedback frequency 









9 0.25€ (students) 
1.00€ (fin. advisors) 
Financial advisors exhibit 






computer 205/205 students 
9 0.25€  MLA also exists over other participants endowment 
 
Van der 







for population)  
3 2.00€ More impatient people are 
stronger affected by MLA  
 
Beshears et al. 
(2017) 
US (Harvard 
University); computer 160/160 students 18 1.60€  
MLA is not persistent if the 
experiment is conducted 





paper and pencil 




Exogenous targets can help 
to overcome MLA and set a 




7.3. Experiment instructions 
Dear Student,  
Thank you again for coming today and welcome to this experimental session! For a smooth 
procedure of the experiment, I would kindly ask you to carefully read the instructions below and 
follow them as strictly as possible. 
Just be yourself: Take the time to think and answer to the best of your capabilities. There is no 
wrong answer and there are no tricks. All your answers will be treated with the uttermost care and 
all your responses will be completely anonymous! 
During the experiment, it is not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, please raise your hand and we will approach you in silence. If a question is relevant for 
other participants, we will answer it aloud for everyone.  
You should have 4 pages, something to write and a calculator. Please fill in your 5-digit student ID 
and your name on top of the sheet.  
Part one (read out loud before lottery seven) 
This experiment is structured as a betting game with 18 successive lotteries and is divided into 
three parts with six lotteries each. In each lottery, you will start with an amount of 10 Experimental 
Credit Units (ECUs). You must decide which part of this amount (between 0 and 10 ECUs) you 
wish to bet in each of in the following lotteries. You have a chance of 2/3 (67%) to lose the amount 
you bet and a chance of 1/3 (33%) to win two and a half times the amount you bet. You are 
requested to record your choice on your questionnaire. Suppose that you decide to bet an amount 
of X ECUs (0 ≤ X ≤ 10) in the lottery. Then you must fill in the amount X in the column headed 
“Bet amount” for every lottery. The remaining amount (10-X) you note in “Saved amount”.  
Only for the low-frequency treatment: Also, you fix your choice for the next three lotteries. Thus, 
if you decide to bet an amount X in the lottery 1, then you also bet an amount X for the following 
lotteries 2 and 3. Therefore, three consecutive lotteries are joined together on the questionnaire.  
Whether you win or lose in the lottery depends on your personal win letter. This letter is indicated 
on top of your questionnaire. Your win letter can be A, B or C, and is the same for all 18 lotteries. 
In any round, you win the lottery if your win letter matches the lottery letter randomly drawn by 
the assistant (each with a probability of 1/3), and you lose vice versa if your win letter does not 
match. Please always record the letter drawn by the assistant in the column “Outcome of lottery”.  
___________ 
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Further instructions for the high frequency-treatment: 
The lottery letter is determined as follows: After you have recorded your bet for the next lottery, 
the assistant will, in a random manner, for each lottery pick one ball from a bag containing three 
letters: A, B, and C. The letter is drawn, clearly shown to all participants and put back in the bag. 
Then the bag is shaken again, and the next draw follows. The letter drawn is the lottery letters for 
the present lottery. The letters are drawn after you have made your bet every lottery. If the lottery 
letter matches your win letter, you win the lottery, otherwise, you lose. The chance of winning a 
given lottery is 1/3 (33%) and the chance of losing is 2/3 (67%). Your earnings in the lottery are 
thus determined as follows: If you have decided to put an amount of X ECUs in the lottery, your 
earnings in the lottery are equal to 0 for each lottery letter that does not match your win letter (i.e. 
you lose the amount bet for the lottery) and equal to 3.5X for each lottery letter that matches your 
win letter (i.e. you win two and a half times the amount bet for the round).  
Further instructions for the low-frequency treatment: 
The lottery letter is determined as follows: After you have recorded your bet for the next three 
lotteries, the assistant will, in a random manner, for each of the next three lotteries pick one ball 
from a bag containing three letters: A, B, and C. The letter is drawn, clearly shown to all 
participants and put back in the bag. Then the bag is shaken again, and the next draw follows. The 
three letters drawn are the lottery letters for the present three lotteries. The letters are drawn after 
you have made your bet every round. If the lottery letter matches your win letter, you win the 
lottery, otherwise, you lose. The chance of winning a given lottery is 1/3 (33%) and the chance of 
losing is 2/3 (67%). Your earnings for the three lotteries are thus determined as follows: If you 
have decided to put an amount of X ECUs in the lottery, your earnings in the lottery are equal to 0 
for each lottery letter that does not match your win letter (i.e. you lose the amount bet for the lottery) 
and equal to 3.5X for each lottery letter that matches your win letter (i.e. you win two and a half 
times the amount bet for the round).  
___________ 
You need to record your earnings in the lottery in the column “Return on betted amount” for every 
lottery. For every lottery calculate the sum of “Saved amount” and “Return on bet amount” in the 
column “Result of the lottery” After lottery six has been completed, you have to sum up the column 
“Total earnings of the lottery” in the field “Total”. This amount determines your total earnings for 
part 1 of the experiment. Then the instructions for part 2 of the experiment will be announced.  
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Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 1 10 8 2 A 7 15 
Lottery 2 10 5 5 B 0 5 
Lottery 3 10 10 0 C 0 10 
Lottery 4 10 3 7 C 0 3 
Lottery 5 10 9 1 B 0 9 
Lottery 6 10 4 6 A 21 25 
Total       67 
 
 
Though this scheme only refers to the first part of the experiment (lotteries 1 to 6), it also applies 
in the same way to the next two parts. Remember that the bet amounts are just exemplary and shall 
not be seen as a strategic suggestion!  









Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 






A 7 15 
Lottery 2 10 B 0 8 
Lottery 3 10 C 0 8 




C 0 3 
Lottery 5 10 B 0 3 
Lottery 6 10 A 24.5 27.5 
Total       64.5 
 
 
Though this scheme only refers to the first part of the experiment (lotteries 1 to 6), it also applies 
in the same way to the next two parts. Remember that the bet amounts are just exemplary and shall 
not be seen as a strategic suggestion!  
- Note: Please stop reading here! We will continue after the first part of the 
experiment! Do not unfold the questionnaire until I tell you! -  
___________ 
Sum up 
Multiply by 3.5  
if letters match 
Sum up 
Multiply by 3.5  
if letters match 
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Part two (read out loud before lottery seven) 
For the exogenous target treatment group: For the next six lotteries, please be aware that the overall 
expected result should you bet every lottery your entire endowment of 10 ECUs is 70 ECUs. If you 
like, you can try and reach this target! Other rules do not change! 
 
For the control group (no exogenous target): Part one of the experiment will now be repeated for 
the second part. No rules will be changed.  
Part three (read out before lottery thirteen) 
You now have the chance to set your own target for your total earnings in ECU for the final six 
lotteries. You receive a bonus of +5% on this target if you reach it and are deducted -5% if you fail 
to do so. Then practically, in the former, you multiply the result of row “Total” in part three by 
0.05 and -0.05 in the latter. 
 
After lottery 18, you also sum up all the “Totals” of all three parts, including your bonus (if you 





Total       67 
 
Part two 
Total       64.5 
 
Part three (assuming you targeted 50) 
Total       70 
Bonus      2.5 
 
Overall  204 
 
Pay-off after the experiment 
After the experiment, you are allowed to convert the ECUs into the sweets offered as rewards. You 
can have a chocolate bar, a banana or an apple for 60 ECUs, a cookie for 20 ECUs and a gummi 
bear for 5 ECUs. Therefore only, your ECUs will be rounded up to the next full five ECUs.  
 
Additionally, the ECUs earned will serve as a ticket in the lottery for the 25€ monetary reward. 
Therefore, the total number of ECUs you have earned will be divided by the number of ECUs 
earned by all participants. Weighted by this the chances for you winning the monetary reward thus 
increase with your total number of ECUs as the probability of one of yours drawn is simply higher. 
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7.4. Experiment questionnaire 
Questionnaire 1: Treatment Group High-Frequency Information/No Exogenous Target (HxN) 
 











Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 1 10      
Lottery 2 10      
Lottery 3 10      
Lottery 4 10      
Lottery 5 10      
Lottery 6 10      











Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 7 10      
Lottery 8 10      
Lottery 9 10      
Lottery 10 10      
Lottery 11 10      
Lottery 12 10      
Total       
 
Part 3 
You now have the chance to set your own target for your total earnings in ECU for the final six 
lotteries. You receive +5% on this target if you reach it and get no bonus if you fail to do so. 
 












Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 13 10      
Lottery 14 10      
Lottery 15 10      
Lottery 16 10      
Lottery 17 10      
Lottery 18 10      
Total        
Bonus       
 
Overall   
 
 32 
Questionnaire 2: Treatment Group Low-Frequency Information/No Exogenous Target (LxN) 
 











Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 1 10      
Lottery 2 10     
Lottery 3 10     
Lottery 4 10      
Lottery 5 10     
Lottery 6 10     











Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 7 10      
Lottery 8 10     
Lottery 9 10     
Lottery 10 10      
Lottery 11 10     
Lottery 12 10     
Total       
 
Part 3 
You now have the chance to set your own target for your total earnings in ECU for the final six 
lotteries. You receive +5% on this target if you reach it and get no bonus if you fail to do so.  
 












Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 13 10      
Lottery 14 10     
Lottery 15 10     
Lottery 16 10      
Lottery 17 10     
Lottery 18 10     
Total        
Bonus       
 




Questionnaire 3: Treatment Group High-Frequency Information/Exogenous Target (HxT) 
 











Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 1 10      
Lottery 2 10      
Lottery 3 10      
Lottery 4 10      
Lottery 5 10      
Lottery 6 10      
Total       
 
Part 2 
For the next six lotteries, please be aware that the overall expected result when betting every lottery 









Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 7 10      
Lottery 8 10      
Lottery 9 10      
Lottery 10 10      
Lottery 11 10      
Lottery 12 10      
Total       
 
Part 3 
You now have the chance to set your own target for your total earnings in ECU for the final six 
lotteries. You receive +5% on this target if you reach it and get no bonus if you fail to do so. 
 












Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 13 10      
Lottery 14 10      
Lottery 15 10      
Lottery 16 10      
Lottery 17 10      
Lottery 18 10      
Total        
Bonus       
 
Overall   
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Questionnaire 4: Treatment Group Low-Frequency Information/Exogenous Target (LxT) 
 











Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 1 10      
Lottery 2 10     
Lottery 3 10     
Lottery 4 10      
Lottery 5 10     
Lottery 6 10     
Total       
 
Part 2 
For the next six lotteries, please be aware that the overall expected result when betting every lottery 









Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 7 10      
Lottery 8 10     
Lottery 9 10     
Lottery 10 10      
Lottery 11 10     
Lottery 12 10     
Total       
 
Part 3 
You now have the chance to set your own target for your total earnings in ECU for the final six 
lotteries. You receive +5% on this target if you reach it and get no bonus if you fail to do so. 
 












Return on bet 
amount 
Total earnings 
of the lottery 
Lottery 13 10      
Lottery 14 10     
Lottery 15 10     
Lottery 16 10      
Lottery 17 10     
Lottery 18 10     
Total        
Bonus       
 
Overall   
 
